Canadian BRM Programs Revisited

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> Feng Qiu With James Rude



Salient facts about BRM intervention

- The BRM policy is a major effort contributing to reducing risk and stabilizing farm income In Canada.
 - Safety nets redistribute income (cut off bottom of cycle not top and premiums are not actuarially sound)
- Policy tool kit includes BRM Suite (AgriInvest, AgriStability, AgriInsurance & AgriRecovery), cash advances, & ad hoc programs
- Evolution of BRM policy has been driven by a number of pressures and constraints:
 - Concerns about government deficits and debt;
 - > The pressures of international trade agreements;
 - A desire not to mask the market signals or affect production decisions

Economic principles vs. industry wishes

OECD (2011) Principles

Do not blunt market signals
Different layers of risk require different responses
Effective policy pays attention to interactions and trade-offs among

- Policies & risk management practices
- Different policies

Industry Demands

Want funds to producers that are timely, predictable, bankable and straight forward
Restore 85% trigger
Roll over unused funding
Young farmer programs

Waive premium 1st 5 years
Make extra Agrilnvest contributions

Encourage participation

Risk management

Tends more to income transfer than stability

Are they compatible?

Preserving market signals

- The BRM programs may encourage excess production and distort trade flows
- Can also affect the entry and exit decisions
- Rewards losses from poor management practices
- In addition, programs
 - Reduce the variance of returns
 - Increase expected returns (wealth effect)
 - Together this creates an incentive to grow riskier crops
 - Portfolio hypothesis gives some explanations: BRM policy likely to encourage farmers to take on more risks in other parts of portfolio to maintain the most efficient portfolio strategy (Gabriel and Baker 1980) & (Uzea et al. 2014)

Interactions with other risk management practices

- How does *AgriStability* affect relevant decisions?
 - Limit the incentives for using on-farm strategies and market risk-management tools
 - Discourage diversification as a tool to mitigate risk
 - Reduce private risk sharing vertical coordination, marketing contracts
- Off-farm labor as risk mitigation strategy which is ignored
- Policies should avoid crowding out the adoption of individual risk mitigation practices and the development of private markets for risk management

Pay attention to different layers of risk

• Risk can be categorized into:

- everyday (normal) risks
- marketable risks (contingent markets)
 - ✓ futures, marketing contracts
- catastrophic risks
- For "normal" risks

Boundaries should be determined with careful analysis and evidencebased, not by political expedience

- should leave the responsibility to the farmers and need no policy intervention
- Don't want multiple coverage for each level of risk
 - Not only complicated (creating off-sets), but also inefficient
 - Why wouldn't each risk layer have a different premium
- •Bottom line there is nothing magical about 85%

Individualized net whole farm margin


- They delay and uncertainty of *AgriStability* payments
 - slows payouts, reduces predictability and adds extra accounting costs
 - Use of tax filer \Rightarrow accrual basis results in:
 - Slows process; uncertain outcomes; increased accounting cost
 - Potential remedies to speed up the process & predictability
 - Move away from whole farm net income to crop specific prices or revenues. But this blunts market signals
 - Use regional net returns as the trigger... lose targeting ability
 - Preliminary and final payments...even more complex
 - By its nature, programs coupled with market risk or uncertainty cannot be predictable

Measuring Performance

- Do BRM programs reduce short term income variability?
 - Simulation exercises indicate a 20-30% reduction
 - OECD (2011) estimates with farm-level data indicate a 20% reduction
 - -0.3 correlation coefficient between margin and program payment
- In a timely manner?
 - Vercammen (2013) short term versus long term On a \$1 loss recovery is 27¢ short run and 84¢ cumulatively in the long run
- Participation rate
 - Not necessarily a good criterion ... increasing participation rate doesn't mean that it is a good risk management tool.

Income Support

• If risk reduction is the primary objective



 One instrument can't achieve both objectives efficiently (Tinbergen's Rule)

Income Support

- If income support is the primary objective
 - Most effective method is a direct/decoupled payment
 - Transfer efficiency is higher
 - Less distortion to markets

Agrilnvest is income support in nature, better not be viewed as a risk management tool

Tips for Effective Policy

- The objectives for providing government supported BRM programs need to be clear
 - Direct payments more consistent with income transfers though have little to do with risk management...and don't expect targeting
- Attention to timing of payouts but difficult to address due to the targeting design
 - Trade-off between individualized margin and timeliness of payment
- Effective BRM programs require better understanding of different layers of risks

Leave the responsibility of "normal risks" to the farmers

• Off-farm income/labor supply deserves some attention

Smooth and increase total net income